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ABSTRACT
Recent advances in quantum computing and the announcement
by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to
define new standards for digital-signature, encryption, and key-
establishment protocols increased interest in post-quantum crypto-
graphic schemes.
This paper introduces Kyber (part of the CRYSTALS – Crypto-
graphic Suite for Algebraic Lattices – package that will be submitted
to the NIST call for post-quantum standards), a portfolio of post-
quantum cryptographic primitives built around a key-encapsulation
mechanism (KEM), based on hardness assumptions over module
lattices. We first introduce a CPA-secure public key encryption
scheme, apply a variant of the Fujisaki–Okamoto transform to cre-
ate a CCA-secure KEM, and eventually construct, in a black-box
manner, CCA-secure encryption, key exchange, and authenticated-
key-exchange schemes. The security of our primitives is based on
the hardness of Module-LWE in the classical and quantum random
oracle models, and our concrete parameters conservatively target
more than 128 bits of post-quantum security.
We implemented and benchmarked the CCA-secure KEM and
key exchange protocols against the ones that are based on LWE and
Ring-LWE: we conclude that our schemes are not only as efficient
but also feature more flexibility and security advantages over the
latter schemes.
KEYWORDS
Lattice cryptography, Key encapsulation mechanism, Implementa-
tion, Module lattices, (Authenticated) key exchange, CCA security.
1 INTRODUCTION
There has been an increased interest in post-quantum cryptographic
schemes triggered by recent advances in quantum computing [34]
and the announcement by the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) to define new standards for digital-signature,
encryption, and key-establishment protocols [26]. Constructions
based on the hardness of lattice problems are considered to be one
of the leading candidates to replace the currently used schemes
based on the believed hardness of the traditional number theoretic
problems such as integer factorization and discrete logarithms.
Lattice cryptography initially gained a lot of interest in the theo-
retical community due to the fact that the designs for cryptographic
constructions were accompanied by security proofs based on worst-
case instances of lattice problems. The first lattice-based encryption
scheme was proposed by Ajtai and Dwork [1]. This scheme was
later simplified and improved upon by Regev in [65, 66]. One of the
major achievements of Regev’s work was the introduction of an
intermediate problem – the Learning With Errors (LWE) Problem –
which was relatively simple to use in cryptographic constructions
and asymptotically at least as hard as some standard worst-case
lattice problems [23, 59].
The LWE assumption states that it is hard to distinguish from
uniform the distribution (A,As+e), whereA is a uniformly-random
matrix in Zm×nq , s is a uniformly-random vector in Znq , and e is a
vector with random “small” coefficients chosen from some distri-
bution. Applebaum et al. [5] showed that the secret s in the LWE
problem does not need to be chosen uniformly at random: the prob-
lem remains hard if s is chosen from the same narrow distribution as
the errors e. Based on the idea from the NTRU cryptosystem [43] of
working with elements over polynomial rings rather than over the
integers, and following a series of works on this topic [54, 56, 61, 68],
Lyubashevsky et al. [55] showed that it is also hard to distinguish a
variant of the LWE distribution from the uniform one over certain
polynomial rings, thus defining the Ring-LWE assumption.
The combination of all of the above results finally led to the cryp-
tosystem in Section 3.1 Setting the parameter k to 1 and defining
Rq = Zq [X ]/(Xn +1) makes the scheme a Ring-LWE cryptosystem
as originally defined in [55], whereas setting the ring Rq to Zq ,
makes the scheme an LWE-based one.2 If one sets the ring Rq to
some polynomial ring of dimension greater than 1 and sets k > 1,
then the scheme is based on the hardness of the Module-LWE prob-
lem [22, 51]. The number of bits that can be transmitted is related
to the dimension of the ring, thus using a ring Rq of larger degree
n allows one to transmit more bits, and this is the main reason that
Ring-LWE encryption is more efficient than LWE encryption. On
the other hand, having a smaller k implies more algebraic struc-
ture, making the scheme potentially susceptible to more avenues
1It should be noted that this cryptoscheme design, as well as the result from [5] applied
to the Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) problem, was already present much earlier in
the work of Alekhnovich [3] in which he constructed a cryptosystem based on the
hardness of the LPN problem. The LWE problem is a generalization of LPN and results
in more efficient cryptosystems.
2The original cryptosystems did not include the “bit-dropping” Compressq functions
in key generation and encryption, but this idea was considered folklore (see [63,
Sec. 2.3] for some references).
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of attack. Nevertheless, at this point in time, it is unknown how to
exploit the algebraic structure of Ring-LWE and concrete parame-
ters are chosen according to the corresponding LWE problem of
dimension k · n.
This cryptosystem design was also applied to build a CPA-secure
KEM by Ding et al. [35] and Peikert [60]. The main difference
between this KEM and the encryption scheme is in how the param-
eterv is defined in line 6 of the encryption algorithm (Algorithm 2).
The advantage of the constructions in [35, 60] is that if one would
like to construct a CPA-secure KEM transmitting a b-bit key, then
the ciphertext is b bits shorter, which is about a 3% savings for
typical parameters.3 If one wishes to construct a CCA-secure KEM,
however, this advantage disappears since typical transformations
from CPA-secure KEMs to CCA-secure ones implicitly go through
a CPA-secure encryption scheme, which will result in adding b
bits to the KEM. Since in this paper we are only concerned with
CCA-secure constructions, we find it simpler to start directly from
the CPA-secure encryption scheme design in Section 3.
The above designs based on Ring-LWE have resulted in many
recent concrete proposals accompanied by practical implementa-
tions. The instantiation presented [19] is based on Ring-LWE and
was subsequently improved in [4, 52], which resulted in an exper-
iment by Google where they used this key-exchange protocol in
their Chrome Canary browser from July to November 2016 [21, 49].
Although the Ring-LWE problem results in very practical key-sizes
and protocol communication, the additional algebraic structure
might inspire less confidence in the underlying security. This was
the motivation to study a very similar practical instantiation of a
key-exchange protocol but based on LWE in [18], or to propose
an efficient implementation of a CCA-secure KEM over a different
ring [12].
1.1 Our contribution
Our main contribution is a highly-optimized instantiation of a
CCA-secure KEM called Kyber, which is based on the hardness
of Module-LWE. More precisely, we instantiate a CPA-secure PKE
schemeKyber.CPA in Section 3, then apply a variant of the Fujisaki–
Okamoto transform to create a CCA-Secure KEM Kyber in Section 4.
The security reduction from the hardness of Module-LWE is tight
in the random-oracle model, but non-tight is the quantum-random-
oracle model [44]. From a CCA-secure KEM, one can construct, in a
black-box manner, CCA-secure encryption (Kyber.Hybrid), key ex-
change (Kyber.KE), and authenticated-key-exchange (Kyber.AKE)
schemes. Our resulting schemes are as efficient as ones that are
based on Ring-LWE, but have additional flexibility and security
advantages.
Flexibility. One of the most expensive operations in lattice-based
schemes over rings is polynomialmultiplication. If a scheme is based
on the Ring-LWE assumption (i.e., with k = 1 in Algorithm 2), then
if one wants to vary the security parameter related to the scheme,
one would need to change the ring Rq and re-implement all the
ring operations. With our design, where we only work over the
3It was mentioned in [60, Sec. 4] that the ciphertext in the KEM goes down by a
factor of two compared to encryption schemes. However, this applies only to the naive
instantiations of encryption schemes where the “bit-dropping” Compressq function
is not applied to v in line 6 of Algorithm 2.
ring Rq = Z7681[X ]/(X 256 + 1), there is only one ring over which
operations need to be optimized. Increasing and decreasing the
security of the scheme can then be done simply by changing the
dimension k of the matrix. Our proposed conservative parameters,
which we believe have very generous margins for 128-bit post-
quantum security, use k = 3. This is the scheme we recommend
using for long-term security. But if one only needs short-term
security, we believe that today (and probably for the near future)
one can safely use k = 2 for which we conservatively estimate
102-bit post quantum security. This latter parameter set will reduce
the communication size of the key exchange by around 33% and
considerably speed up the scheme. The main building blocks of the
two schemes are exactly the same, and any optimized software /
hardware used for efficient multiplication in Rq can be re-used.
Security. There have been recent attacks exploiting the algebraic
structure of cyclotomic ideal lattices [15, 24, 31, 32], and others that
exploit the presence of dense sub-lattices in NTRU lattices [2, 47].
In these attacks, it appears that the dimension of the module makes
a big difference. In particular, the quantum attacks on finding short
vectors in ideals currently do not extend to Ring-LWE [15, 24, 31,
32]. The obstacle seems to be that solutions to the shortest vector
problem in ideal lattices are ring elements, whereas solutions to the
Ring-LWE problem are elements in a module of dimension 2. In that
respect, solutions to Module-LWE are in a module of dimension
k + 1. Similarly, the larger module dimension also decreases the
relative dimension of the dense sub-lattice, making the attack of [47]
inapplicable. Based on the recent cryptanalytic progress, it therefore
seems that practical attacks are less likely to appear against Module-
LWE than against Ring-LWE or NTRU.
High performance.As we previously mentioned, the main reason
that Ring-LWE is preferred to LWE in practical applications is
because it allows for a larger message to be transmitted in the same
amount of communication.We show that the flexibility and security
improvements by moving from Ring-LWE to Module-LWE come at
almost no cost. In particular, since public-key protocols only need
to transmit 256 bits of information, it is unnecessary to work with
rings that are greater than dimension 256 in order to be able to
transmit one bit per coefficient of a ring element. Thus the key and
message sizes of our protocols versus those based on Ring-LWE
are not affected.
The one part where using a k > 1 is less efficient than k = 1 is
when dealing with the k × k random matrix A. If one uses k = 1
and a ring of dimension n, then the representation of A is k2n = n
elements in Zq . On the other hand, if one uses k = 3 and a ring
of dimension n/3 (thus keeping the lattice-reduction security the
same), then A requires k2n = 3n elements in Zq to represent. Since
the matrix A is never stored, but rather expanded from some seed
ρ using an XOF, this disadvantage only manifests in the slight
increase in the running time used in the expansion. This is to some
extent mitigated because the k2 entries of the matrix A can be
expanded independently, which enables very efficient vectorization
of the XOF computation.
Take away. In this paper, we propose and implement a portfolio
of post-quantum cryptographic primitives (CPA-secure encryp-
tion, CCA-secure KEM, CCA-secure public-key encryption, key
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exchange and authenticated key exchange) based on the hardness
of Module-LWE in the classical and quantum random-oracle mod-
els. Our schemes are as efficient as the ones based on Ring-LWE,
but also feature flexibility and security advantages.
Availability of software.We place all software described in this
paper into the public domain to maximize reusability of our re-
sults. It is available for download on GitHub: https://github.com/
pq-crystals/kyber.
2 PRELIMINARIES
All our algorithms are probabilistic. If b is a string, then a ← A(b)
denotes the output of algorithm A when run on input b; if A is
deterministic, then a is a fixed value and we write a B A(b). We use
the notationb B A(b; r ) to make the randomness r of a probabilistic
algorithm A explicit.
2.1 Cryptographic definitions
A public-key encryption scheme PKE = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) is a
triple of probabilistic algorithms together with a message spaceM.
The key-generation algorithm KeyGen returns a pair (pk, sk) con-
sisting of a public key and a secret key. The encryption algorithm
Enc takes a public key pk and a message m ∈ M to produce a
ciphertext c . Finally, the deterministic decryption algorithm Dec
takes a secret key sk and a ciphertext c , and outputs either a mes-
sagem ∈ M or a special symbol ⊥ to indicate rejection. We say
that PKE is (1 − δ )-correct if for all messages m ∈ M, we have
Pr[Dec(sk,Enc(pk,m)) = m] ≥ 1 − δ , where the probability is
taken over (pk, sk) ← KeyGen() and the random coins of Enc.
We recall the standard security notions for public-key encryp-
tion of indistinguishability under chosen-ciphertext and chosen-
plaintext attacks (IND-CCA and IND-CPA) [64]. The advantage of
an adversary A is defined as AdvccaPKE (A) =
Pr

b = b ′ :
(pk, sk) ← KeyGen();
(m0,m1,s ) ← ADec( ·) (pk);
b ← {0,1}; c∗ ← Enc(pk,mb );
b ′ ← ADec( ·) (s,c∗)

− 12

,
where the decryption oracle is defined as Dec(·) B Dec(sk, ·). We
further require that |m0 | = |m1 | and that in the second phase A is
not allowed to query Dec(·) with the challenge ciphertext c∗. The
advantage AdvcpaPKE (A) of an adversary A is defined as Adv
cca
PKE (A),
with the modification that A cannot query the decryption oracle.
A key-encapsulation scheme KEM = (KeyGen,Encaps,Decaps)
is a triple of probabilistic algorithms together with a key space K .
The key-generation algorithm KeyGen returns a pair (pk, sk) con-
sisting of a public key and a secret key. The encapsulation algorithm
Encaps takes a public key pk to produce a ciphertext c and a key
K ∈ K . Finally, the deterministic decapsulation algorithm Decaps
takes a secret key sk and a ciphertext c , and outputs either a key
K ∈ K or a special symbol⊥ to indicate rejection. We say that KEM
is (1− δ )-correct if Pr[Decaps(sk,c ) = K : (c,K ) ← Encaps(pk)] ≥
1− δ , where the probability is taken over (pk, sk) ← KeyGen() and
the random coins of Encaps.
We recall the standard security notion for key encapsulation of
indistinguishability under chosen-ciphertext attack. The advantage
of an adversary A is defined as AdvccaKEM (A) =
Pr

b = b ′ :
(pk, sk) ← KeyGen();
b ← {0,1};
(c∗,K∗0 ) ← Encaps(pk);K∗1 ← K ;
b ′ ← ADecaps( ·) (pk,c∗,K∗b )

− 12

,
where the Decaps oracle is defined as Decaps(·) B Decaps(sk, ·).
We further require that A is not allowed to query Decaps(·) with
the challenge ciphertext c∗.
In the random oracle model [9], the adversary A is additionally
given access to a random oracle that it can query up to qH times.
If the adversary has access to a quantum computer, it is realistic
to model its access to all “offline primitives” (such as hash func-
tions) in a quantum setting. Concretely, in the quantum random
oracle model [17] the adversary has access to a quantum random
oracle (also called quantum accessible random oracle) that can be
queried up to qH times on arbitrary quantum superpositions of
input strings.
2.2 Rings and distributions
Let R and Rq denote the rings Z[X ]/(Xn + 1) and Zq[X ]/(Xn +
1), respectively, where n = 2n′−1 such that Xn + 1 is the 2n′-th
cyclotomic polynomial. Throughout this paper, the values of n, n′
and q are 256, 9 and 7681, respectively. Regular font letters denote
elements in R or Rq (which includes elements in Z and Zq ) and bold
lower-case letters represent vectors with coefficients in R or Rq . By
default, all vectors will be column vectors. Bold upper-case letters
are matrices. For a vector v (or matrix A), we denote by vT (or AT )
its transpose.
Modular reductions. For an even (resp. odd) positive integer α ,
we define r ′ = r mod± α to be the unique element r ′ in the range
−α2 < r ′ ≤ α2 (resp. −α−12 ≤ r ′ ≤ α−12 ) such that r ′ = r mod α .
For any positive integer α , we define r ′ = r mod+α to be the unique
element r ′ in the range 0 ≤ r ′ < α such that r ′ = r mod α . When
the exact representation is not important, we simply write r mod α .
Rounding. For an element x ∈ Q we denote by ⌈x⌋ rounding of x
to the closest integer with ties being rounded up.
Sizes of elements. For an element w ∈ Zq , we write ∥w ∥∞ to
mean |w mod± q |. We now define the ℓ∞ and ℓ2 norms for w =
w0 +w1X + . . . +wn−1Xn−1 ∈ R:
∥w ∥∞ = max
i
∥wi ∥∞, ∥w ∥ =
√
∥w0∥2∞ + . . . + ∥wn−1∥2∞.
Similarly, for w = (w1, . . . ,wk ) ∈ Rk , we define
∥w∥∞ = max
i
∥wi ∥∞, ∥w∥ =
√
∥w1∥2 + . . . + ∥wk ∥2.
Distributions. For a set S , wewrite s ← S to denote that s is chosen
uniformly at random from S . If S is a probability distribution, then
this denotes that s is chosen according to the distribution S .
Extendable output function. Suppose that Sam is an extendable
output function, that is a function on bit strings in which the out-
put can be extended to any desired length. If we would like Sam
to take as input x and then produce a value y that is distributed
according to distribution S (or uniformly over a set S), we write
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y ∼ S B Sam(x ). It is important to note that this procedure is
completely deterministic: a given x will always produce the same y.
For simplicity we assume that the output distribution of Sam is
perfect, whereas in practice Sam will be implemented using ran-
dom oracles and produces an output that is statistically close to the
perfect distribution.
Binomial distribution.We define the centered binomial distribu-
tion Bη for some positive integer η as follows:
Sample (a1, . . . ,aη ,b1, . . . ,bη ) ← {0,1}2η and output
η∑
i=1
(ai −bi ).
If v is an element of R, we write v ← βη to mean that v ∈ R is gen-
erated from a distribution where each of its coefficients is generated
according to Bη . Similarly, a k-dimensional vector of polynomials
v ∈ Rk can be generated according to the distribution βkη .
Compression and Decompression. We now define a function
Compressq (x ,d ) that takes an element x ∈ Zq and outputs an
integer in {0, . . . ,2d − 1}, where d < ⌈log2 (q)⌉. We furthermore
define a function Decompressq , such that
x ′ = Decompressq
(
Compressq (x ,d ),d
)
(1)
is an element close to x – more specifically
|x ′ − x mod± q | ≤ Bq B
⌈ q
2d+1
⌋
.
The functions satisfying these requirements are defined as:
Compressq (x ,d ) = ⌈(2d/q) · x⌋ mod+2d ,
Decompressq (x ,d ) = ⌈(q/2d ) · x⌋ .
If x ′ is a function of x as in Eq. (1), then for a randomly chosen
x ← Zq , the distribution of
x ′ − x mod± q
is almost uniform over the integers of magnitude at most Bq . In
particular, this distribution has equal weight over integers of mag-
nitude at most Bq − 1 and has a smaller weight on the integer(s) of
magnitude Bq .
When Compressq or Decompressq is used with x ∈ Rq or x ∈
Rkq , the procedure is applied to each coefficient individually.
The main reason for defining the Compressq and Decompressq
functions is to be able to discard some low-order bits in the public
key and the ciphertext which do not have much effect on the cor-
rectness probability of decryption – thus making the parameters
smaller. The Compressq function is also used in one other place
where its intuitive purpose is not to “compress”. In line 3 of the
decryption procedure (Algorithm 3), the function is used to decrypt
to a 1 if v − sT u is closer to ⌈q/2⌋ than to 0, and decrypt to a 0
otherwise.
2.3 Module-LWE
Let k be a positive integer parameter. The hard problem under-
lying the security of our schemes is Module-LWE. It consists in
distinguishing uniform samples (ai ,bi ) ← Rkq × Rq from samples
(ai ,bi ) ∈ Rkq ×Rq where ai ← Rkq is uniform and bi = aTi s+ei with
s ← βkη common to all samples and ei ← βη fresh for every sam-
ple.4 More precisely, for an algorithm A, we define Advmlwem,k,η (A) =Pr
[
b ′ = 1 : A← R
m×k
q ; (s,e) ← βkη × βmη ;
b = As + e;b ′ ← A(A,b)
]
− Pr
[
b ′ = 1 : A← Rm×kq ; b← Rmq ;b ′ ← A(A,b)
]  .
3 KYBER’S IND-CPA-SECURE ENCRYPTION
Let k,dt ,du ,dv be positive integer parameters, and recall that n =
256. Let M = {0,1}256 denote the message space, where every
message m ∈ M can be viewed as a polynomial in R with co-
efficients in {0,1}. Consider the public-key encryption scheme
Kyber.CPA = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) as described in Algorithms 1 to 3.
Algorithm 1 Kyber.CPA.KeyGen(): key generation
1: ρ,σ ← {0,1}256
2: A ∼ Rk×kq B Sam(ρ)
3: (s,e) ∼ βkη × βkη B Sam(σ )
4: t B Compressq (As + e,dt )
5: return (pk B (t,ρ), sk B s)
Algorithm 2 Kyber.CPA.Enc(pk = (t,ρ),m ∈ M): encryption
1: r ← {0,1}256
2: t B Decompressq (t,dt )
3: A ∼ Rk×kq B Sam(ρ)
4: (r,e1,e2) ∼ βkη × βkη × βη B Sam(r )
5: u B Compressq (A
T r + e1,du )
6: v B Compressq
(
tT r + e2 +
⌈q
2
⌋
·m,dv
)
7: return c B (u,v )
Algorithm 3 Kyber.CPA.Dec(sk = s,c = (u,v )): decryption
1: u B Decompressq (u,du )
2: v B Decompressq (v,dv )
3: return Compressq (v − sT u,1)
Correctness. We show below the correctness of the encryption
scheme described in Algorithms 1 to 3. We will select parameters
in Section 6 to make the decryption error negligible, i.e., so that
Kyber.CPA is (1 − δ )-correct with δ < 2−128.
Theorem 3.1. Letk be a positive integer parameter. Let s,e,r,e1,e2
be random variables that have the same distribution as in Algorithms 1
and 2. Also, let ct ← ψkdt ,cu ← ψ
k
du
,cv ← ψdv be distributed
according to the distributionψ defined as follows:
Letψkd be the following distribution over R:
4While the exact distribution shape does not seem to play any role in the hardness
of (Module)-LWE encryption schemes, we mention that it is possible to show with
a simple Rényi divergence-based analysis a la [4, 7] that one can substitute βη with
the n-dimensional rounded Gaussian distribution of standard deviation
√
η/2, which
was the one considered in [51].
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1: Choose uniformly-random y← Rk
2: return
(
y − Decompressq
(
Compressq (y,d ),d
))
mod± q.
Denote
δ = Pr
[eT r + e2 + cv − sT e1 + cTt r + sT cu∞ ≥ ⌈q/4⌋ ] .
Then Kyber.CPA is (1 − δ )-correct.
Remark 3.2. We provide with our software a Python script that
allows to compute a tight upper bound on δ ; the parameter set we
recommend for Kyber in Table 1 yields δ = 2−142.
Proof. The value of t in line 6 of Algorithm 2 is:
t = Decompressq
(
Compressq (As + e,dt ),dt
)
= As + e + ct ,
for some ct ∈ Rk . The value of u in Algorithm 3 is
u = Decompressq
(
Compressq (A
T r + e1,du ),du
)
= AT r+e1+cu ,
for some cu ∈ Rk . And the value of v is
v = Decompressq
(
Compressq (t
T r + e2 +
⌈
q/2⌋ ·m,dv ),dv )
= tT r + e2 +
⌈
q/2⌋ ·m + cv
= (As + e + ct )T r + e2 +
⌈
q/2⌋ ·m + cv
= (As + e)T r + e2 +
⌈
q/2⌋ ·m + cv + cTt r,
for some cv ∈ R. In all of the above, we can safely assume that the
values ct ,cu , and cv are distributed according to the distributionψ
defined in the Theorem statement. The reason is that all of these
are of the form
(
y − Decompressq
(
Compressq (y,d ),d
))
mod± q
where y is pseudo-random based on the hardness of Module-LWE.
Using the above, we obtain
v − sT u = eT r + e2 + ⌈q/2⌋ ·m + cv + cTt e1 − sT r + sT cu
If eT r + e2 + cv − sT e1 + cTt r + sT cu∞ < ⌈q/4⌋, then we can
write v − sT u = w + ⌈q/2⌋ · m where ∥w ∥∞ < ⌈q/4⌋ . Define
m′ = Compressq (v − sT u,1). We then know that
⌈q/4⌋ ≥ ∥v − sT u− ⌈q/2⌋ ·m′∥∞ = ∥w + ⌈q/2⌋ ·m − ⌈q/2⌋ ·m′∥∞.
By the triangle inequality and the fact that ∥w ∥∞ < ⌈q/4⌋, we
obtain
∥⌈q/2⌋ · (m −m′)∥∞ < 2 · ⌈q/4⌋,
which (for all oddq) implies thatm =m′, and proves the correctness
of Kyber.CPA. □
Security.We prove that the encryption scheme defined above is
IND-CPA secure under the Module-LWE hardness assumption.
Theorem 3.3. For any adversary A, there exists an adversary B
such that AdvcpaKyber.CPA (A) ≤ 2 · Advmlwek+1,k,η (B).
Proof. Let A be an adversary that is executed in the IND-CPA
security experiment which we call game G0, i.e., Adv
cpa
PKE (A) =| Pr[b = b ′ in game G0] − 1/2|. In game G1, the value t′ B As + e
which is used in KeyGen is substituted by a uniform random value.
It is possible to verify that there exists an adversary B with the
same running time as that of A such that | Pr[b = b ′ in game G0] −
| Pr[b = b ′ in game G1]| ≤ Advmlwek,k,η (B) ≤ Advmlwek+1,k,η (B). In game
G2, the values u′ B AT r + e1 and v ′ B tT r + e2 used in the
generation of the challenge ciphertext are simultaneously substi-
tuted with uniform random values. Again, there exists an adver-
sary B with the same running time as that of A with | Pr[b =
b ′ in game G1] − | Pr[b = b ′ in game G2]| ≤ Advmlwek+1,k,η (B). Note
that in game G2, the value v from the challenge ciphertext is in-
dependent of bit b and therefore Pr[b = b ′ in game G2] = 1/2.
Collecting the probabilities yields the required bound. □
4 THE CCA-SECURE KEM
Let G : {0,1}∗ → {0,1}3×256 and H : {0,1}∗ → {0,1}256 be hash
functions. Consider the public-key key encapsulation mechanism
Kyber = (KeyGen,Encaps,Decaps) as described in Algorithms 1, 4
and 5, where KeyGen is the same as the one of Kyber.CPA from the
previous section, with the difference that sk also contains pk = (ρ, t)
and a secret 256-bit random value z. It is obtained by applying a
KEM variant [44] of the Fujisaki–Okamoto transform [37, 69] to
the Kyber.CPA encryption scheme. Note that we make explicit the
randomness r in the Enc algorithm.
Algorithm 4 Kyber.Encaps(pk = (ρ, t))
1: m ← {0,1}256
2: (Kˆ ,r ,d ) B G(pk,m)
3: (u,v ) B Kyber.CPA.Enc ((ρ, t),m; r )
4: c B (u,v,d )
5: K B H(Kˆ ,c )
6: return (c,K )
Algorithm 5 Kyber.Decaps(sk = (s,z,ρ, t),c = (u,v,d ))
1: m′ B Kyber.CPA.Dec(s, (u,v ))
2: (Kˆ ′,r ′,d ′) B G(pk,m′)
3: (u′,v ′) B Kyber.CPA.Enc ((ρ, t),m′; r ′)
4: if (u′,v ′,d ′) = (u,v,d ) then
5: return K B H(Kˆ ′,c )
6: else
7: return K B H(z,c )
8: end if
We stress that Kyber.Decaps never returns ⊥. Instead, in case
re-encryption fails, it returns a pseudo-random key K := H(z,c ),
where z is a random, secret seed.
Correctness. If Kyber.CPA is (1 − δ )-correct and G is a random
oracle, then Kyber is (1 − δ )-correct [44].
Security. The following concrete security statement provesKyber’s
CCA-security when the hash functions G and H are modeled as
random oracles. We provide the concrete security bounds from [44]
which considers the KEM variant of the FO transformation and also
takes a non-zero correctness error δ into account.
Theorem 4.1. For any adversary A that makes at most qH many
queries to random oracle H, at most qG many queries to random
oracle G, and qD queries to the decryption oracle, there exists an
adversary B such that
AdvccaKyber (A) ≤ 3Adv
cpa
Kyber.CPA (B) + qH · δ +
2qG + qH + 1
2256
.
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Note that the security bound is tight. In particular, in combination
with Theorems 3.1 and 3.3 we obtain a tight reduction from the
Module-LWE hardness assumption. We remark that there exists an
alternative security reduction from the weaker notion of ONE-WAY
CPA-security [44] of Kyber.CPA which is, however, not tight as it
loses a multiplicative factor qG .
The value d in Kyber’s ciphertexts is not necessary for the secu-
rity proof in case H and G are modeled as standard random oracles.
However, it is crucial for a proof in the quantum random oracle
model. Concretely [44, 69] proved that Kyber is CCA secure in
the quantum random oracle model, provided that Kyber.CPA is
CPA-secure. Again, we provide the concrete bound from [44].
Theorem 4.2. For any quantum adversary A that makes at most
qH many queries to quantum random oracle H, at most qG many
queries to quantum random oracle G, and at most qD many (classical)
queries to the decryption oracle, there exists a quantum adversary B
such that
AdvccaKyber (A) ≤ 4qH
√
qD · qH · δ + qG ·
√
AdvcpaKyber.CPA (B).
Unfortunately, as it is common for proofs in the quantum ran-
dom oracle model, the above security bound is far from tight and
therefore can only serve as an asymptotic indication of Kyber’s
CCA-security in the quantum random oracle model.
Hashing pk into Kˆ . The Kyber CCA transform is essentially the
transform from [44, 69], with one small tweak: we hash the public
key pk into Kˆ . This tweak has two effects. First, it makes the KEM
contributory; the shared keyK does not depend only on input of one
of the two parties. The second effect is a multi-target protection.
Consider an attacker who searches through many values m to
find one that is “likely” to produce a failure during decryption.
Such a decryption failure of a legitimate ciphertext would leak
some information about the secret key. In the pre-quantum setting
this attack approach is doomed because of the negligible failure
probability δ . In a post-quantum setting, the attacker could use
Grover’s algorithm to search for such anm. However, the attacker
is then facing the problem to encode “likely to produce a decryption
failure” in the Grover oracle. This is equivalent to identifying noise
vectors that are likely to have a large inner product with (s,e);
probably the best strategy is to search for m that produce noise
vectors of large norm. Even though we believe this attack approach
is unlikely to result in any better performance than a brute-force
Grover search of the 256-bit shared keyK , hashingpk into Kˆ ensures
that an attacker would not be able to use precomputed valuesm
against multiple targets.
CCA-secure public-key encryption. We remark that a CCA-
secure public-key encryption scheme can be obtained by combining
the CCA-secure KEM Kyber with any CCA-secure symmetric en-
cryption scheme [33] (aka. DEM). We describe the resulting hybrid
encryption scheme Kyber.Hybrid in Appendix A.
5 KEY EXCHANGE PROTOCOLS
Let Kyber = (KeyGen,Encaps,Decaps) be the IND-CCA secure
KEM from the previous section. Figure 1 describes the Kyber key
exchange protocol Kyber.KE obtained as a direct application of the
key encapsulation mechanism. In key exchange constructions using
a KEM, it is common to hash the “view” of each participant (i.e.,
all received and sent messages) into the final key. In Kyber, the
public key pk is hashed into the “pre-key” Kˆ and the ciphertext is
hashed into the final key K ; hence the shared key obtained in a key
exchange already includes the complete “view” of each participant.
P1 P2
(pk, sk) ← Kyber.KeyGen() pk
(c, K ) ← Kyber.Encaps(pk)
ckey B Kyber.Decaps(sk, c ) key B K
Figure 1:Kyber.KE –KeyExchange protocol using theKyber =
(KeyGen,Encaps,Decaps) key encapsulation mechanism.
Authenticated key exchanges protocols. Note that the protocol
of Fig. 1 by itself only provides security against passive adversaries
(and in particular fails to protect against man-in-the-middle attacks).
Let H : {0,1}∗ → {0,1}256 be a hash function. Figure 2 describes
our one-sided (unilateral) authenticated key exchange protocol
Kyber.UAKE in which party P1 knows the static (long-term) key
of party P2, and Fig. 3 describes our authenticated key-exchange
protocol Kyber.AKE where each party knows the static (long-term)
key of the other party.
P1 P2
Static keys
(pk2, sk2 ) ← Kyber.KeyGen()
pk2 public auth. key
sk2 secret auth. key
(pk, sk) ← Kyber.KeyGen()
(c2, K2 ) ← Kyber.Encaps(pk2 )
pk, c2
(c, K ) ← Kyber.Encaps(pk)
K ′2 B Kyber.Decaps(sk2, c2 )
cK ′ B Kyber.Decaps(sk, c )
key B H(K ′, K2 ) key B H(K, K ′2 )
Figure 2: Kyber.UAKE – One-sided authenticated key ex-
change protocol using Kyber, where P1 knows the static pub-
lic key of P2.
The shared key derived at the end of the above protocols not only
depends on the ephemeral key and ciphertext (pk,c ), but also on the
static (long-term) keys pki and associated ephemeral ciphertexts ci
(where i = 2 and i = 1,2 respectively).
Our authenticated key-exchange protocols follow a generic con-
struction from any CCA-secure encryption scheme. Concretely,
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P1 P2
Static keys
(pk1, sk1 ) ← Kyber.KeyGen() (pk2, sk2 ) ← Kyber.KeyGen()
pk1 public auth. key
sk1 secret auth. key
pk2 public auth. key
sk2 secret auth. key
(pk, sk) ← Kyber.KeyGen()
(c2, K2 ) ← Kyber.Encaps(pk2 )
pk, c2
(c, K ) ← Kyber.Encaps(pk)
(c1, K1 ) ← Kyber.Encaps(pk1 )
K ′2 B Kyber.Decaps(sk2, c2 )
c, c1K ′ B Kyber.Decaps(sk, c )
K ′1 B Kyber.Decaps(sk1, c1 )
key B H(K ′, K ′1, K2 ) key B H(K, K1, K
′
2 )
Figure 3: Kyber.AKE – Authenticated key exchange protocol
usingKyber, where both parties knows their respective static
public keys.
Table 1: Kyber parameter set, aiming at 128-bit classical and
post-quantum security, with generous margins.
n k q η (du ,dv ,dt ) δ pq-sec
Kyber 256 3 7681 4 (11,3,11) 2−142 161
security of Kyber.AKE in the Canetti–Krawczyk model with weak
forward secrecy [25] follows directly from the generic security
bounds of [20, 36]. (Note that full forward secrecy is not achievable
for a two-round authenticated key-exchange protocol [25].)
6 PARAMETERS AND SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section we give the Kyber parameter set that aims at 128 bits
of post-quantum (and classical) security, with a generous security
margin to account for future improvements in cryptanalysis. We
only consider the parameters that are relevant to the underlying
lattice problem; instantiations of symmetric primitives are given in
Section 7.
The parameters of Kyber are summarized in Table 1. The first
parameter we fixed was n = 256, which stems from the fact that we
want to encapsulate 256 bits of entropy (targeting a 128-bit security
level for symmetric keys [39]) and that we want to encode each of
these bits into one polynomial coefficient. We then picked q = 7681
as the smallest prime that fulfills q ≡ 1 mod 2n, which allows us
to use fast multiplication in Rq based on the negacyclic number-
theoretic transform (NTT). The next parameter we fixed is k = 3,
which controls the dimension of the lattice, and thereby largely the
security. Finallywe tuned the parametersη,du ,dv , anddt to balance
security, failure probability δ , public-key size, and ciphertext size.
We decided to fixdu = dt = 11, which unifies compression of public
keys and the “key component” u of the ciphertext.
Core-SVP hardness. To analyze the security of Kyber, we follow
the methodology introduced in [4, Sec. 6.1]. This means that we
assume that the best way to solve the Module-LWE problem under-
lying Kyber is to treat it as a general LWE problem. Moreover we
consider the primal and dual attacks to be the only known attacks
relevant to our parameter sets. After optimizing the parameters for
the primal attack with respect to the success criteria of [4, Sec. 6.3],
we find that the attack would invoke BKZ with blocksize 610 to 615
(depending on whether one uses the primal or dual attack). The cost
of BKZ with blocksize 610 is dominated by a polynomial number of
calls to a dimension 610 SVP solver. Suppressing this polynomial
number of SVP calls and all subexponential factors in the cost of
the best known quantum algorithm for SVP [48, Sec. 14.2.10], this
implies a cost of > 2161 operations in the quantum RAM model.
According to this very conservative analysis, Kyber offers 161 bits
of security against the best known quantum attacks targeting the
underlying lattice problem.
LWE security vs. LWR security. The analysis in the previous
paragraph considers only the noise introduced by addition of “noise
polynomials” sampled from βη ; it does not take into account the ad-
ditional uniform noise introduced by rounding. Various recent pro-
posals for lattice-based cryptosystems rely only on this noise from
rounding. See for example the schemes proposed in [12] and [28].
In some sense, the rounding induces a deterministic noise, and it is
not clear how this determinism affects concrete security. On one
hand, there are reductions between LWR and LWE, but they involve
substantial losses, especially in the ring setting [8]. In particular,
they do not apply when the number of dropped bits is so small. On
the other hand, there is, to our knowledge, no attack that performs
better on LWR than LWE with the corresponding uniform noise.
(See [16, Sec. 4] for a reduction from LWR to LWE with correspond-
ing uniform noise.) Yet it is not clear to us that LWR has received
any dedicated attention from cryptanalysts, and we therefore prefer
to remain conservative and estimate security of Kyber only based
on the LWE noise.
Resistance to hybrid attacks. Several schemes [12, 42] are poten-
tially vulnerable to a hybrid attack [38, 45], mixing lattice reduction
techniques with Meet-in-the-Middle combinatorial search. This
attack is particularly difficult to analyze, and recent work [70] sug-
gests that it is often not as competitive as previously thought. We
note that this attack is especially relevant when secrets and errors
are ternary and sparse, which is not the case for our design.
Algebraic attacks. The main novelty of our design is in the use of
Module-LWE rather than Ring-LWE. One of the motivations for
this change is to move further away from the recently uncovered
weaknesses of ideal lattices [15, 24, 31, 32] – yet without the cost
of using completely unstructured LWE. The work of [32] mentions
obstacles towards a quantum attack on Ring-LWE from their new
techniques, but nevertheless suggests using Module-LWE, as it
plausibly creates even more obstacles.
Scaling security and performance. A particularly attractive fea-
ture of Module-LWE (as compared to LWE or Ring-LWE) is, that
scaling security only needs marginal changes to existing, possibly
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highly optimized implementations. Specifically, the only param-
eters that need to change to scale security (and performance) of
Kyber, are k and η; note that optimized code for polynomial arith-
metic is not affected by changing those parameters. Table 2 lists one
“paranoid” parameter set aiming at security similar to NewHope
(using dimension n · k = 1024) and one “light” parameter set that
might become interesting for the 96-bit security level, or, with a
tighter security analysis for the 128-bit security level, if continued
effort in cryptanalysis does not produce significantly better attacks.
The Core-SVP hardness analysis against the best known quan-
tum attacks yields 218 bits of security for the paranoid parameter
set and 102 bits of security for the light parameter set.
A note on passively secure KEMs. We note that in order to
support the CCA transformation, we need a negligible (in the
cryptographic sense) failure probability. Previous proposals like
NewHope [4] or Frodo [18] are designed to only achieve pas-
sive security and can live with much higher failure probabilities
(≈ 2−60 for NewHope and 2−38.9 for the recommended parame-
ter set of Frodo). If one were to optimize a passively secure KEM
from Module-LWE, one could reduce the rounding parameters du
and dt to du = dt = 10 to further reduce public-key size (to 992
bytes) and ciphertext size (to 1088 bytes) while increasing the failure
probability (to 2−71.9).
7 IMPLEMENTATION
In this section we give all the remaining details of our implemen-
tations of Kyber and report on performance of subroutines. Both
implementations are fully protected against timing attacks. All
cycle counts in this section were obtained on one core of an In-
tel Core-i7 4770K (Haswell) with hyperthreading and TurboBoost
turned off running at 3.5GHz. They are median cycle counts over
1000 measurements.
7.1 Primitives and encodings
Sections 3 and 4 introduce Kyber in abstract terms without fixing
concrete instantiations of the functions H, G, and Sam, and with-
out fixing encodings of messages. This subsection details concrete
instantiations of these building blocks.
Symmetric primitives. The main symmetric building blocks are
the two hash functions H and G, a function that accepts as input
the public seed ρ and generates the uniform matrix A ∈ Rk×kq , and
a function that accepts as input a secret seed r and generates as
output noise polynomials sampled from βη . Note that in passively
secure KEMs like BCNS [19], NewHope [4], or Frodo [18], the
choice of how noise polynomials are sampled is a local decision:
implementations on different platforms can choose whatever PRNG
is the best option on the respective platform. This is also true for
noise generation in Kyber’s key generation, but, because of the CCA
transform, is no longer true for noise generation in encapsulation.
We decided to instantiate all hash functions with the extendable
output function SHAKE-128, standardized in FIPS 202 [58]. For the
expansion of (public and secret) seeds we use the domain-separated
version cSHAKE-128, that has recently been standardized in FIPS
800-185 [46]. All cSHAKE-128 domain separators in Kyber are 2
bytes long; we will denote them in the following as (i, j ), where i is
the byte at the lower address. With this choice, all symmetric prim-
itives in Kyber rely on the same underlying primitive, namely the
Keccak-f 1600 permutation. The only exception is that for key gen-
eration, different implementations are free to use whatever PRNG
is offering the best performance and security on their respective
platform.
We are aware that another choice of symmetric primitives would
yield somewhat better performance on most platforms. For exam-
ple, we could have decided to use SHA256 for all hashes (with
output extension for G via MGF1; see [57, App. B.2.1]), and AES
in counter mode for the expansion of seeds. This choice would
certainly be faster on platforms with hardware AES and SHA256
support. However, on platforms without hardware support, AES
implementations are notorious for timing-attack vulnerabilities.
Furthermore, as pointed out in [4, Sec. 3], the use of a PRG (which
AES in counter mode is), is not helpful to argue security, because in
the generation of A, the input is public, whereas security of a PRG
is only given for secret inputs.
Other possible choices of primitives that would yield better per-
formance are be the ChaCha20 stream cipher [10] that has recently
been standardized for TLS [50] or the BLAKE2X extendable output
function [6]. Unfortunately, neither of these functions has received
a lot of cryptanalytic attention, yet, so we prefer to stick to the
conservative choice of SHAKE-128, which was standardized after
years of cryptanalytic scrutiny through the course of the SHA-3
competition.
The NTT domain. Computing the discrete Fourier transform on
elements from Rq can be done with methods analogous to the
fast Fourier transform [29], except that operations on coefficients
are defined in a finite field [62]. This is often referred to as the
number theoretic transform (NTT). Before being able to define the
expansion of the seed ρ into the matrix A, we need to define the
NTT domain of polynomials. Let ω = 3844 ∈ Zq andψ = √ω = 62,
whereψ is chosen as the smallest element of multiplicative order 29
in F∗q = F∗7681.
For a polynomial g = ∑255i=0 дiX i ∈ Rq we define the polynomial gˆ
in NTT domain as
NTT(g) = gˆ =
255∑
i=0
дˆiX
i , with дˆi =
255∑
j=0
ψ jдjω
i j .
The inverse NTT−1 of the function NTT is essentially the same as
the computation of NTT, except that it uses ω−1 mod q = 6584,
multiplies by powers of ψ−1 mod q = 1115 after the summation,
and also multiplies each coefficient by the scalar n−1 mod q = 7651,
so that
NTT−1 (gˆ) = g =
255∑
i=0
дiX
i , with дi = n−1ψ−i
255∑
j=0
дˆjω
−i j .
For two polynomials f ,g ∈ Rq , the product fg can be computed as
NTT−1 (NTT(f ) ◦ NTT(g)), where ◦ denotes the point-wise multi-
plication.
Generation of A. Generation of the matrix A = (ai,j ) ∈ Rk×kq
receives as input the public seed ρ. To generate the entry ai,j ∈ Rq
we first expand ρ through cSHAKE-128 with the 2-byte domain
separator (i, j ). The output of this expansion is considered a stream
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Table 2: Alternative parameter sets for higher and lower security levels.
n k q η (du ,dv ,dt ) δ pq sec. |pk | in bytes |c | in bytes
Paranoid 256 4 7681 3 (11,3,11) 2−145 218 1 440 1 536
Light 256 2 7681 5 (11,3,11) 2−169 102 736 832
of 16-bit little-endian integers. On this sequence of 16-bit integers
we run rejection sampling as follows: first set the upper 3 bits of
the integers to zero, then use the resulting integer as coefficient
for ai,j if it is smaller than q, otherwise discard it and move to
the next 16-bit integer. Fill the polynomial ai,j starting from the
constant coefficient moving to the coefficient belonging to Xn−1.
The resulting polynomial ai,j is assumed to be in NTT domain.
Note that this generation of A exhibits k2-way parallelism for the
expansion of ρ.
Generation of noise polynomials. Noise polynomials in Kyber
are sampled from β4. To obtain such a noise polynomial we first
expand a seed to an array of n = 256 uniformly random bytes
(r0, . . . ,r255). We then generate coefficient ei of a noise polynomial
e =
∑255
i=0 eiX
i by subtracting the Hamming weight of the most
significant nibble of ri from the Hamming weight of the least sig-
nificant nibble of ri . As stated above, the choice of how the 256
uniformly random bytes are generated during key generation is a
local, platform-dependent choice. During encapsulation we again
use cSHAKE-128 with 2-byte domain separators to expand the 32-
byte secret r to 256 bytes. To generate r = (r0,r1,r2) we use domain
separators (0,0), (1,0), and (2,0); to generate e1 = (e1,0,e1,1,e1,2)
we use domain separators (3,0), (4,0), and (5,0); and to generate
e2 we use domain separator (6,0). Note that r is used as input to
a multiplication, which is computed via the fast negacyclic NTT
operation outlined above. In order to compute the NTT inplace,
we would first have to bit-reverse the order of coefficients in r.
As in NewHope, we omit this bitreversal, and instead assume the
coefficients of r to be in bit-reversed order.
Inputs toG andH . The description of the CCA transform includes
the public key pk as input of G and includes the ciphertext c =
(u,v,d ) as input of H. In the implementation we instead include
H(pk ) and H(c ). The two additional hashes may seem redundant,
but simplify implementation with a non-incremental API for G
and H. Furthermore using H(pk ) instead of pk as input to G enables
a small speedup for decapsulation at the cost of a slightly increased
secret-key size as explained in the next paragraph.
Encoding of keys and ciphertexts. In NewHope, polynomials
in public keys and the ciphertext are in NTT domain; in Kyber all
polynomials sent over the channel are in normal domain. This is
necessary for the compression through rounding (see Section 3) to
work.
A Kyber public key is a tuple (t,ρ), where t is a vector of three
polynomials with 256 11-bit coefficients each, and ρ is a 32-byte
seed.We encode the polynomials in compressed little-endian format
to fit it in (256 · 11)/8 = 352 bytes, concatenate the compressed
three polynomials and finally concatenate ρ to obtain public keys
of 3 · 352 + 32 = 1088 bytes.
A Kyber secret key is a vector of three polynomials in NTT
domain with 256 13-bit coefficients each. We store these polyno-
mials in compressed little-endian format resulting in a total of
(3 · 256 · 13)/8 = 1248 bytes. For re-encapsulation during decapsula-
tion we additionally need the public key, which we simply concate-
nate and store as part of the secret key. Finally, we also concatenate
H(pk ) to avoid having to compute this hash during decapsulation
and concatenates the 32 bytes of the value z that is used to compute
the pseudo-random returned key when re-encapsulation fails. This
results in a total size of 1248 + 1088 + 32 + 32 = 2400 bytes for the
secret key.
A Kyber ciphertext is a 3-tuple (u,v,d ), where u is a vector of
three polynomials with 256 11-bit coefficients each, v is a polyno-
mial with 256 3-bit coefficients, and d is a 32-byte hash. Using the
same compressed little-endian format for polynomials as for keys
we obtain ciphertexts with a total size of 3 · 352+ (3 · 256)/8+ 32 =
1184 bytes.
Size-speed tradeoffs. It is possible to use different tradeoffs be-
tween secret-key size and decapsulation speed. If secret-key size is
critical, it is of course possible to not store H(pk ) and also to not
store the public key as part of the secret key but instead recompute
it during decapsulation. Furthermore, not keeping the secret key in
NTT domain makes it possible to compress each coefficient to only
5 bits, resulting in a total size of only 320 bytes for the three poly-
nomials. Finally, as all randomness in key generation is generated
from two 32-byte seeds, it is also possible to only store these seeds
and re-run key generation during decapsulation.
In the other direction, if secret-key size does not matter very
much and decapsulation speed is critical, one might decide to store
the expanded matrix A as part of the secret key and avoid recom-
putation from the seed ρ during the re-encapsuation part of decap-
sulation.
All performance results reported in the following assume the
secret-key format described in the previous paragraph; i.e., with
polynomials in NTT domain, including the public key and H(pk ),
but not including A.
7.2 Reference implementation
Kyber’s reference implementation in C follows much in the spirit of
the NewHope reference implementation described in [4, Sec. 7.2].
In particular, it only relies on 16-bit and 32-bit integer arithmetic
(outside of Keccak) and uses the same combination of short Bar-
rett reductions and Montgomery reductions to accelerate the NTT
computation. One consequence of the modulus q = 7681 is that
the short Barrett reduction becomes slightly more efficient; an un-
signed 16-bit integer a can be reduced to an unsigned integer r
between 0 and 11768 and congruent modulo q via the following
three operations:
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u = a >> 13;
u *= KYBER_Q;
r = a - u;
7.3 AVX2 implementation
Modern 64-bit Intel processors feature the AVX2 vector-instruction
set that supports operations on 256-bit vectors that can be in-
terpreted as vectors of 8 single-precision or 4-double-precision
floating-point numbers, or as vectors of integers of various sizes.
These AVX2 instructions were also used for the optimized imple-
mentation of the optimized NewHope software described in [4,
Sec. 7].
Polynomial arithmetic. For polynomial arithmetic we represent
polynomials as arrays of double-precision floating-point numbers.
This representation results in a very fast NTT computation as first
described in [41, Sec. 3.2] and also used for NewHope in [4]. Essen-
tially, our implementation of the NTT follows the same approach
as [41] and [4], except that we carefully optimize for n = 256 and
q = 7681. Specifically, we merge levels 0–4 and then merge lev-
els 5–7 to reduce load and store operations. The 13-bit modulus
q allows us to reduce coefficients modulo q only every 3 levels.
We reduce after level 1 (i.e., after 2 levels), then again after level
4, and finally after level 7. To make best use of the 53-bit radix of
double-precision floats, we precompute powers of ω in the range
[−q/2,q/2] and also reduce to this range inside the NTT. Only the
last modular reduction goes back to unsigned representation. One
NTT takes 1 992 cycles; an NTT−1 operation includes a bit reversal
and takes 2 632 cycles.
We also use vectorized double-precision floating point arith-
metic for pointwise multiplication and polynomial addition and
subtraction.
Vectorized Keccak. As mentioned earlier, Keccak has a reputa-
tion of not being particularly fast in software. One reason is that
Keccak is very hard to vectorize; in fact, according to the eBACS
benchmarks, the fastest implementation of Keccak on Intel Haswell
processors is the non-vectorized “simple64” implementation.
The picture changes drastically if a protocol can compute multi-
ple independent streams of SHA-3, SHAKE, or cSHAKE on inputs
and outputs of the same length. More specifically, the Keccak code
package [14] includes an implementation for AVX2 that computes 4
independent streams in parallel. We make use of this 4-way parallel
implementation in the expansion of ρ involved in the generation of
the matrixA and also in the generation of noise polynomials during
encapsulation. Specifically, for the generation of A, we generate 8
streams of uniformly random 16-bit numbers via two calls to this
function, leaving only one sequential SHAKE-128 call. In encap-
sulation we generate 8 arrays of 256 uniformly random bytes via
two calls to 4-way parallel cSHAKE-128 and discard one of those
arrays. The speedup from vectorized Keccak is crucial: compared
to NewHope, Kyber needs to generate more than twice as many
uniformly random polynomial coefficients, yet, with 34 304 cycles,
generation of the matrix a is about as fast as generation of the
equivalent value a in NewHope.
Rejection sampling. Part of the generation of A is rejection sam-
pling on the stream of 16-bit integers produced by the cSHAKE-128
expansion. We adopt the fast vectorized approach described in [40]
for this task. One difference is that we do not need to first con-
ditionally subtract q four times; we simply eliminate the upper 3
bits of each 16-bit integer in a 256-bit vector through one mask
instructions and then compare to a constant vector filled with 16-bit
copies of q.
7.4 Flexibility of Kyber
One possible use of Kyber is for ephemeral key exchange, for exam-
ple in TLS 1.2 as illustrated by [19] and by Google’s post-quantum
TLS experiment [21] with NewHope.5 Indeed, the experiment con-
cluded that they “did not find any unexpected impediment to de-
ploying something like NewHope” [49] and Kyber features perfor-
mances close to the one of NewHope but with smaller sizes.
However, the CCA security of Kyber makes it a much more
versatile tool. Not only is it possible to cache ephemeral keys for
some time (which would be a security disaster for BCNS, Frodo,
or NewHope), we can also use it for classical IND-CCA public-
key encryption of messages of arbitrary length [33] (cf. the hybrid
CCA-secure scheme of Appendix A) and for authenticated key
exchange protocols, as described in Fig. 3. The Kyber software
package includes implementations of the unilaterally authenticated
key exchange Kyber.UAKE described in Fig. 2 and the mutually
authenticated key exchange Kyber.AKE described in Fig. 3.
8 PERFORMANCE RESULTS AND
COMPARISON
In this section we report on the performance of our standalone im-
plementations of Kyber, Kyber-based authenticated key exchange,
and an integration of Kyber within the Open Quantum Safe (OQS)
framework6 [67].
8.1 Standalone Kyber
In Table 3 we give performance results of the standalone imple-
mentations of Kyber and compare them to results from the litera-
ture on lattice-based KEMS, key-exchange protocols, and encryp-
tion schemes. We compiled the Kyber software with gcc-4.9.2
with optimization flags -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -msse2avx
-mavx2 -march=corei7-avx, except for the non-vectorized im-
plementation of Keccak, which we compile with clang-3.5.10
with flags -march=native -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv
-Qunused-arguments.
To give an indication of security levels obtained by the different
schemes we include the core-SVP hardness estimation (“Sec. estim.”)
following the approach from [4]. Note that this estimate does not
say anything about the applicability of hybrid or algebraic attacks.
8.2 Kyber-based authenticated key exchanges
To illustrate one use case of Kyber and to establish a data point for
high-performance post-quantum authenticated key exchanges, the
Kyber software package includes implementations of Kyber.AKE
and Kyber.UAKE. The performance in terms of message sizes and
CPU cycles (for our AVX2 optimized software) is summarized in
5Note that one can easily combine KEMs (e.g., Kyber with a pre-quantum KEM) by
hashing the shared secret keys together.
6https://www.openquantumsafe.org
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Table 3: Comparison of lattice-based KEMs and public-key encryption. Benchmarks were performed on an Intel Core i7-4770K
(Haswell) if not indicated otherwise. Cycles are stated for key generation (K), encapsulation/encryption (E), and decapsu-
lation/decryption (D) Bytes are given for secret keys (sk), public keys (pk), and ciphertexts (c). The column “ct?” indicates
whether the software is running in constant time, i.e., with protection against timing attacks.
Scheme Sec. estim. Prob. ct? Cycles Bytes
Passively secure KEMs
BCNS [19] 78a Ring-LWE yes K: ≈ 2 477 958 sk: 4096
E: ≈ 3 995 977 pk: 4096
D: ≈ 481 937 c: 4224
NewHope [4] 255a Ring-LWE yes K: 88 920 sk: 1792
(AVX2 optimized) E: 110 986 pk: 1824
D: 19 422 c: 2048
Frodo [18] 130a LWE yes K: ≈ 2 938 000b sk: 11 280
(recommended parameters) E: ≈ 3 484 000b pk: 11 296
D: ≈ 338 000b c: 11 288
CCA-secure KEMs
NTRU Prime [12] 129a NTRUk yes K: ?c sk: 1417
E: > 51488c pk: 1232
D: ?c c: 1141
spLWE-KEM [27] 128i spLWE ? K: ≈ 336 700d sk: ?
(128-bit PQ parameters) E: ≈ 813 800d pk: ?
D: ≈ 785 200d c: 804
Kyber (this paper) 161i Module-LWE yes K: 276 720 sk: 2368
(C reference) E: 332 800 pk: 1088
D: 376 104 c: 1184
Kyber (this paper) 161i Module-LWE yes K: 77 892 sk: 2400
(AVX2 optimized) E: 119 652 pk: 1088
D: 125 736 c: 1184
CCA-secure public-key encryption
NTRUEncrypt ees743ep1[42] 159a NTRU no K: 1 194 816 sk: 1 120
E: 57 440 pk: 1 027
D: 110 604 c: 980
Lizard [28] 128i LWE+LWR no K: 97 573 000f sk: 466 944g,h
(recommended parameters) E: ≈ 35 050f pk: 2 031 616h
D: ≈ 80 840f c: 1072
a According to the conservative “best known quantum attack” estimates from [4].
b Benchmarked on a 2.6GHz Intel Xeon E5 (Sandy Bridge).
c The NTRU Prime paper reports benchmarks only for polynomial multiplication.
d Benchmarked on “PC (Macbook Pro) with 2.6GHz Intel Core i5”.
e Benchmarked by eBACS [13] on Intel Xeon E3-1275 (Haswell).
f As reported by the software from https://github.com/LizardOpenSource/Lizard_c, compiled with gcc-6.3 with flags
-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -msse2avx -mavx2 -march=native on Intel Core i7-4770K.
g Unlike our scheme, the paper reports secret-key size without the public key required for decryption in the Targhi-Unruh transform.
h Sizes used by the software; those could be compressed by a factor 1.6, incurring only small computational overhead.
i According to the conservative “best known quantum attack” estimates from [4], with appropriate adaptations (balanced lattice attacks [28, Sec. 4.2]).
k The problem underlying NTRU Prime is subtly different than in NTRU; it uses a different ring than commonly used in NTRU and uses deterministic noise.
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Table 4: Message sizes and cycle counts for Kyber.UAKE and
Kyber.AKE.
Bytes Cycles
P1 → P2 P2 → P1 P1(start) P2 P1(end)
UAKE 2 272 1 184 197 980 248 388 253 448
AKE 2 272 2 368 195 464 364 188 379 036
Table 5: Timings for post-quantum key exchanges (C refer-
ence implementations) in Open Quantum Safe.
Scheme Operations (µs)
P1 (start) P2 P1 (end)
SIDH [30] 15 015 33 530 14 241
McBits [11] 170 892 53 133
Frodo [18] 3 436 4 027 105
BCNS [19] 1 087 1 729 178
NewHope [53] 60 104 19
NewHope [4] 69 107 18
Kyber 77 100 110
Table 4. The only paper describing an implementation of lattice-
based authenticated key exchange that we are aware of is [71]. Our
software outperforms the results of [71] by more than two orders
of magnitude.
8.3 Integration with OQS
The Open Quantum Safe (OQS) aims at supporting the development
and prototyping of quantum-resistant cryptography. In particular,
it proposes a common API for post-quantum key exchange algo-
rithms, making it easy to integrate new algorithms and compare to
alternatives. We integrated the reference C implementation of our
CCA-secure KEM Kyber in OQS library, liboqs, and ran the bench-
marking command ./test_kex --bench; the results are provided
in Table 5.
Note that the timings differ slightly from those of Table 3. Indeed,
liboqs provides reference implementations for randomness sam-
pling, AES, Keccak and ChaCha20; our reference implementation
has been minimally modified to be compatible with those API. Also,
only the reference C implementation of NewHope is (as of today)
integrated to liboqs and not the AVX2-optimized version listed in
Table 3. Finally, all implementations have been compiled with the
same flags, which does not necessary reflect the full potential of
every implementation. Note that, once integrated to liboqs, it is
easy to integrate Kyber to OQS’s fork of OpenSSL 1.0.2.7
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A THE CCA-SECURE ENCRYPTION SCHEME
We use the canonical way proposed by Cramer and Shoup to
compose Kyber, our secure key encapsulation mechanism (KEM),
with a secure one-time symmetric-key encryption (SKE, or DEM)
scheme [33]. We call Kyber.Hybrid the resulting hybrid encryption
scheme.
On the choice of a symmetric encryption scheme. Any SKE scheme
that is (one-time) secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks and with
key space K = {0,1}256 can be combined with our key encapsula-
tion mechanism Kyber. Typical examples include AES-OCB, AES-
GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305. Depending on one’s application and
architecture, different needs and choices for the symmetric encryp-
tion scheme are possible; we decide in this paper to not restrict
ourselves to a specific application nor to a specific cipher. Addition-
ally to the previously mentioned ciphers, several submissions to
the Caesar competition for authenticated encryption are serious
candidates for SKE.
Description of Kyber.Hybrid. We describe the public-key hybrid
encryption scheme Kyber.Hybrid = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) in Algo-
rithms 6 to 8, assuming a SKE (E,D) where the encryption algo-
rithm E takes as input a key in K = {0,1}256 and a message in
{0,1}∗ and outputs a ciphertext, and where the decryption algo-
rithmD takes as input a key and a ciphertext and outputs a message
(or the rejection symbol ⊥).
Algorithm 6 Kyber.Hybrid.KeyGen()
1: (pk B (ρ, t), sk B (s,ρ, t)) ← Kyber.KeyGen()
2: return (pk, sk)
Algorithm 7 Kyber.Hybrid.Enc(pk = (ρ, t),m)
1: (c,K ) ← Kyber.Encaps(pk)
2: c ′ B E (K ,m)
3: return c ′′ B (c,c ′)
Algorithm 8 Kyber.Hybrid.Dec(sk = (s,z,ρ, t),c ′′ = (c,c ′))
1: K B Kyber.Decaps(sk,c )
2: return m B D (K ,c ′)
Correctness and security. The correctness and security of our
hybrid encryption scheme Kyber.Hybrid follow from those of the
KEM and the chosen SKE [33, Th. 5].
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